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AGENCY INTERFACE WITH THE PUBLIC

OUTLINE

Security Staff Study

24 May 1966

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I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this Staff Study is to examine the primary considerations related to the Agency interface with the public and the public media with respect to the identification and participation of Agency employees at meetings, seminars, societies, conferences and the like; their publication of unclassified articles and studies, including revelation of their Agency affiliation; and to submit recommendations for consideration in updating current Agency policies, criteria and regulations on these subjects in the light of present conditions.

II. SYNOPSIS OF CURRENT REGULATIONS, TO INCLUDE POLICIES, CRITERIA AND CONDITIONS HAVING A BEARING ON THESE SUBJECTS

"The security of CIA is dependent upon the conduct and activities of every individual who, through his employment relationship to the Agency, has access to classified information. In order to ensure that the security of CIA activities is adequately protected, it is necessary to prescribe certain standards and procedures for the guidance of individuals in the conduct of their private affairs and to place some limitation on their participation in unofficial outside activities." (Synopsis is attached as Tab A)


III. CONSIDERATIONS IN IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL AS AGENCY ASSOCIATED IN THESE ACTIVITIES

A. Employees Affected

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B. Degree of Present Participation in Speaking and Writing - Period 1965 to March 1966.

(1) 119 professional articles, 71 amateur submitted to OS and Assistant to DCI.

(2) 60% "professional" category, 62% of which from DDI - [redacted] with 44% from [redacted] assigned in NPIC.

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(3) Represents about [redacted] of analysts in DDI, which Directorate believes percentage would go much higher with wider participation permitted. DDS&T input presently negligible in number of employees concerned.

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C. Presentation of Papers, Active Participation in Symposiums, Seminars, etc. with Identification as CIA Employee.

(1) Advantages

(a) Employee benefits

(1) Would receive academic/professional recognition.

SECRET

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(ii) Would be permitted activity normally denied employee but allowed consultant in some instances.

**(b) Agency benefits**

(i) To enhance "image," would reflect Agency as employer of scholars, scientists, professionals of high achievement and stature.

(ii) Would attract young scholars/scientists for recruitment.

(iii) Would assist in retention of professionals through permitting them recognition in their fields.

(iv) Would bring about closer relationships between Agency and colleges, universities, private organizations and professional enterprises and mitigate to a degree the growing hostility of some toward the Agency.

(v) Would tend to convey to a degree to the general public that the Agency mission is not exclusively a clandestine one.

**(2) Disadvantages**

**(a) To employee**

(i) Reduced future personal movement abroad and in professional fields where CIA affiliation not desirable.

(ii) Acts to limit opportunities for assignment by Agency.

(iii) Possibly stronger criticism of activities and statements than would be expected - due to his association with CIA. Greater difficulty handling questions on subject matter and on the Agency itself.

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(iv) Difficulty in divorcing personal achievements from Agency - in minds of persons with whom associating in seminars, etc. Similar difficulty in divorcing Agency acquired data from that personally acquired otherwise.

(v) Preclude participation because sponsor (college, professional organization, etc.) is opposed to any overt tie to CIA or its employees due to the public image of CIA as a clandestine organization.

(vi) Confirm identity of employees as Agency affiliated and thus establish them as targets for opposition.



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(b) To Agency

(i) A greater exposure of Agency, undermining public image of anonymity and silence. A danger of over-exposure of the Agency if participation is not fettered somewhat.

(ii) Criticism of Agency for "permitting" disclosures - whether valid or not.

(iii) Employees will be considered to be voicing Agency positions and levels of knowledge - even on nonsensitive matters as well as on subjects of direct or peripheral intelligence interest.

(iv) Agency cannot be consistent - cannot permit all analysts/scientists to participate - resultant questions, possible undermining of impact of participation, further mistrust, suspicion of Agency's motives -- if persons not identified are "surfaced" by outside action. Morale factors if some employees are permitted to participate, others not.

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(v) Psychologically, a more liberal policy in this respect would act to affect present controls over the release and declassification of classified materials.

(vi) Possible attraction to Agency of persons who, while qualified professionally and academically, wish to enter CIA to avail themselves of data for future personal use and aggrandizement.

D. Authoring Manuscripts for Publication in Outside Media  
With Identification as a CIA Employee

Comment: Advantages and Disadvantages, cited above, apply equally. Published writings, however, are usually more widely disseminated, provide a permanent record, are more easily accessible. Additional comment is thus in order:

(1) Advantages

(a) To employee

(i) Authors can point to published works for further academic and professional recognition at the appropriate level - where publication is both desired and necessary to gain individual respect.

(b) To the Agency

(i) Publication by competent professionals strengthens the Agency's position of intellectual ability and integrity.

(2) Disadvantages

(a) To the employee

(i) A published work permits more time for critical review, opens up the arena for charges, replies, etc. As with a sponsor, a publisher

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
may well not desire to reflect any association with CIA or an Agency employee, either precluding publication or forcing omission of the association. An author may have more difficulty convincing the public his work is his own and has no Agency connection.

**(b) To the Agency**

(i) Published works can more easily be used as a vehicle for attacks on the Agency, and by a larger number of persons.

(ii) Due to the wider dissemination, published works are more significant from standpoint of release of information, would require closer review to protect the Agency.

(iii) Attribution to the Agency would be more likely, acceptance of work as authentic would be more prevalent, solely by identification of author with CIA. That a CIA employee publishes would imply approval of a work by the Agency - when the work deals with matters of current national or international interest. This could well have embarrassing repercussion in a political sense, i. e. Senator Fullbright.



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**F. Agency Employees as Teachers**

The use of Agency employees as teachers and instructors at colleges and universities would be an advantage to the Agency provided these employees are clearly known as CIA employees.

**SECRET**

IV. FINDINGS

Comment: Based upon study of this matter and related data, the following findings are submitted:

A. Current Agency policies permit the activities in question but restrict identification of employees with CIA.

B. Current Regulations and Notices take negative or nonpermissive rather than positive approach.

C. Staff Employees with no cover, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] can be identified with the Agency.

E. Personnel now engaging in these activities are assigned primarily in DDI and could be identified with CIA.

F. There are advantages and disadvantages to the employee and to CIA in identification with the Agency in these activities.

G. Assuming that current Agency policy is trending toward improvement of the Agency's public image, the disadvantages do not outweigh the advantages pre-supposing appropriate command level and security controls.

H. Present procedures in the submitting of requests for approval to engage in these activities do not place sufficient responsibility on the requestor or on the command level to assure protection from disclosures of sensitive information, or embarrassment due to improprieties.


I. Identification of an employee with CIA increases the requirement for placing this responsibility on the requestor and his command channel.

J. According to present regulations, without exception, employees must request approval to speak or to write on virtually every conceivable subject, ranging from highly sensitive and/or controversial



**SECRET**

matters to completely nonsensitive subjects. Examples drawn from both over the past several months are:



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K. To preclude statements or publications by CIA personnel on matters of concern to the intelligence community after they leave the employ of this Agency, there is only the Secrecy Agreement signed by the employee.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. An Agency Notice be published to establish clear policies and procedures on the Agency interface with the public and the public media concerning the identification and participation of Agency employees in meetings, seminars, societies, etc. and in the publication of unclassified articles and studies. Such Notice should:

(1) Emphasize that it is Agency policy to permit the identification of employees with CIA - other than those who are prohibited for cover reasons - in such activities, contingent upon approval, on a case-by-case basis, by operating officials, the Office of Security and the Assistant to the DCI.

(2) Emphasize that it is Agency policy to encourage greater camaraderie with key individuals in academic, private and professional enterprises.

(3) Include the placing of initial and continuing responsibility on the employee and on the operating official concerned to prevent the release of sensitive information and to protect the Agency and the U. S. Government from embarrassment due to improprieties.

**SECRET**

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(4) Operating officials should be responsible for making an initial determination that the activity is clearly divorced from matters of Agency interest and not objectionable from an Agency point of view. Each case, however, should be sent to the Office of Security and to the Assistant to the DCI for a final determination that there are no special security or policy factors involved which would preclude the activity.

B. Revise Agency regulations after a reasonable period of time to incorporate the above policies.

C. Action be initiated by the Office of Security in coordination with the Office of the General Counsel to establish what can be done to effect controls over former CIA employees who may wish to make statements or publish articles on matters of concern to the Agency.

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